Human Events *A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen*

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A COMPARISON WITH 1900

By Kiyoshi K. Kawakami

As I read the press reports of what is going on in Manchuria, my mind goes back to the turn of this century, when, as a student of world affairs, I followed the events which were shaping history in that cauldron of power politics.

Soviet acts in Manchuria are strikingly similar to those of Czarist Russia following the Boxer Incident of 1900. The parallel is so close that a re-examination, at this time, of the developments which resulted in the Manchurian war of 1904-05 is of more than historical interest.

The Boxer disturbances were confined to the south of the Great Wall, leaving Manchuria normally tranquil. Yet Russia poured troops into that area, under the pretext of restoring peace and order. Within a short time, Russia held all the strategic points in the Three Eastern Provinces, as Manchuria was then officially called.

Although the Boxer uprising was practically liquidated by the autumn of 1900, Russia, disregarding Anglo-American protests, continued to maintain its military occupation of the whole of Manchuria.

Under date of September 13, 1901, a year after the end of the Boxer disturbances, Dr. G. E. Morrison, the noted London Times correspondent in China, reported that the closing of the Open Door in Manchuria was becoming more and more evident; that Americans were looked on:

> ". . . with keen suspicion if they ventured farther than a couple of miles from the treaty port of Newchwang, that the Russians refused to recognize a British passport and insisted that all British subjects travelling in Manchuria must possess Russian passes which are procured with great difficulty and considerable delay."

On April 18, 1902, Russia, in response to the increasing Anglo-American pressure, finally signed an agreement with China, whereby it recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and promised to withdraw its troops therefrom within 18 months. Yet even when the stipulated Russian evacuation was well underway, Dr. Morrison reported:

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"In every case evacuation means the removal of Russian troops to a point from which the city evacuated can be struck immediately and without resistance. Manchuria is absolutely dominated by Russia."

II

These developments drew England and Japan closer, resulting in their alliance concluded on January 30, 1902. Commenting on this alliance, the New York Times said contemporaneously:

"While we are not a party to it, it is no secret that our interests and our sympathies are wholly enlisted on the side of its objects. The recent and present performances of Russia give us a fair opportunity to underwrite the Alliance, so to say, so that for most practical purposes Russia finds herself confronted with an Anglo-Japanese-American alliance."

Meanwhile Russia pressed upon China a series of new demands of a nature to nullify the agreement of April 18, 1902. On May 5, 1903, the London Times reported that these demands included the following items:

1. No portion of Manchuria shall be transferred under any form to another power;
2. The existing [autonomous] administration of Mongolia shall not be altered;
3. China shall not open any new ports or permit new consuls of other powers without the permission of the Russian Government;
4. No foreigners other than Russians shall be employed in any administrative capacity in Manchuria and Mongolia;
5. Russia shall retain control of the telegraph lines in Manchuria;
6. The Russo-Chinese Bank [a purely Russian institution] shall continue to function as a Chinese customs bank;
7. All rights acquired in Manchuria by Russians during the occupation shall remain in force after the evacuation.

On April 18, 1903, 17 days before the above terms were published, the British and American Ambassadors at St. Petersburg had inquired of the Russian Government whether any demands had actually been presented to the Chinese Government. They were assured that, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, no demands had been made, and that none would be made. At Washington, Count Cassini, the Czarist Ambassador, assured the Department of State that his Government had no intentions "inimical to American interests".

III

On April 26, 1903, the American Government addressed a note separately to Russia and China, warning them against the conclusion of any new agreement which would confer upon Russia any special privileges contrary to the principles of the "Open Door". This

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example was soon followed by Japan.

On July 29, 1903, Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate, a British Intelligence officer in China, reported to the War Office in London:

> " . . . that the Russians have obtained a stronger hold over Manchuria than is generally supposed; that they are perfectly in earnest in their intention gradually to obtain the mastery over the country until it shall have, by the force of circumstances, become a Russian province; that nothing will cause them to withdraw in any way except force; that they are very anxious to avoid a conflict, but that they will accept a challenge sooner than give way."

Meanwhile Russian ambitions had extended to Korea. By May, 1903, Russians occupied Yungampo, a village on the Korean side of the Yalu River, the natural dividing line between Manchuria and Korea. On June 5 of the same year, the London Times reported that the Russians had already constructed roads passable for field artillery south of the Yalu.

Commenting on this phase of the Czarist advance, Geoffrey Drage, an outstanding British expert on Russian affairs in those days, wrote:

> "To Russia, Korea is no doubt an object of desire; its possession would round off and give completeness to her Asiatic empire; it would protect the sea communication between Vladivostok and Port Arthur and ensure the safety of the Manchurian railway against attack from the south."

IV

Inevitably one compares these events, verifiable in any standard American or English history of modern China, with what has transpired in and about Manchuria since the secret agreement of Yalta, February 11, 1945. The comparison gives much to think about.

First, there is the Treaty of August 14, 1945, which China was practically compelled to sign with Russia, confirming all the concessions made to Stalin at Yalta, where there was no Chinese participation. Russia, on its part, pledged itself to respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and to withdraw all Russian troops therefrom not later than three months after Japan's surrender, or by December 3, 1945.

Second, upon one pretext or another, Russian evacuation has been postponed, and even now, three months after the deadline, no definite date has been set for it. Until last week's agreement for merger of Chinese Communist troops into a single Nationalist Army, it was not unreasonably anticipated that the Russians planned to stay until the

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Chinese Communist Army in Manchuria became strong enough to control that area.

Offsetting present reasons for optimism is, thirdly, the evidence that Russia, far from being satisfied with the territorial and economic concessions given it at Yalta, is still seeking greater concessions reminiscent of the secret Czarist demands pressed upon China in 1902.

Fourth, non-Russian foreigners are excluded from Manchuria even more rigidly than under Czarist occupation of that territory.

Fifth, Secretary of State Byrnes, on February 9, sent a note to the Chinese and Russian Governments in which he invoked the principle of the "Open Door" as to Manchuria and, on March 5, dispatched another note to Russia protesting Soviet pressure on China for a half interest in the basic enterprises of Manchuria.

In China, in spite of official restraint, a vigorous agitation against Russian "encroachments" has already begun. Five hundred Chinese representing non-Communist political, business and intellectual leaders in Manchuria, on February 16 urged the Nationalist Government to deal more vigorously with Russia. On February 22, more than 10,000 students paraded in Chungking, denouncing Soviet imperialism. Since then, the demonstrations have spread to other Chinese cities.

In 1904, much the same situation caused Japan to declare war upon Russia. Will another nation, whose interest is less selfish than was Japan's, have to bring pressure now to save Manchuria for China? Perhaps UNO, for which there was no parallel in 1900, will find a way to attain the same objective through the exercise of reason. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is in a better position than ever before to demand a public examination of all the evidence.

Unless the problem is solved to China's satisfaction there is danger that the present anti-Russian agitation will assume a more ominous aspect. There is a portent in the fact that seven high officials of the Chungking Government have denounced the Yalta Agreements as a "dark stain" upon Anglo-American relations with China.

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NOTES AND QUOTES

Norman Thomas, in The Call, February 11, makes this penetrating observation on the future of the PAC: "Even if the PAC temporarily won a little more, there is an outstanding precedent in American politics to warn it of ultimate failure. The Anti-Saloon League was a better vehicle by which an earnest minority could manipulate the two party system, by throwing its weight in primaries of one or both parties. It won the amazing prohibition victory by its manipulative skill. But it did not educate either the administrators of its prohibition legislation or the citizens. Granting that probably no tactics would have made prohibition work -- that's far harder to carry through than constructive social legislation -- the strategy of putting through one measure is simpler than the PAC's task of putting through their program."

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The Hon. Andre Michalopoulos, Greek Minister, just returned from London, in a CBS broadcast February 16, said: " . . . my observations of proceedings at the United Nations Assembly in London filled me with grave misgivings. My mind went back to the days of peacemaking in 1918 and 1919 . . . the first Assembly of the United Nations Organization gave me the distinct impression of a still-born child. The spirit of faith which animated the builders of the League was totally absent. After the last war people really believed that peace could be secured and that laws could be enacted to subject violence to the dictates of human decency. . . . but the delegates in London seemed to me to be totally lacking in the one thing that can create a basis for world peace -- I mean a real belief that it can and must be attained. The dominant emotions at the Conference were those of apprehension and fear. And fear breeds compromise; and compromise in questions of principle is a great incentive to discord. . . .

There were a number of forthright exchanges of antagonistic views between the great powers, notably over the Greek and Indonesian questions. The opportunity to air those disputes in an open forum of the nations no doubt acts as a safety valve provided that the arguments on either side are conducted in a spirit of good faith. But none the less my own personal impression was that the forces compressed behind power barriers that separate the post-war world exceed by far and most dangerously the capacity of the new international organization to control them."

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That outspoken British columnist, George Orwell, in the London Tribune, January 19, writes realistically about a subject commonly confused by much unrealistic comment: "Food is a political weapon, or is thought of as a political weapon. The hungriest areas are either in the Russian zone or in the parts of Europe that are divided between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies. Many people calculate that if we send more food to, say, Hungary, British or American influence in Hungary will increase: whereas if we let the Hungarians starve and the Russians feed them, they are more likely to look towards the U.S.S.R. All those who are strongly Russophile are therefore against sending extra food to Europe, while some people are probably in favour of sending food merely because they see it as a way of weakening Russian prestige. . . . The folly of all such calculations lies in supposing that you can ever get good results from starvation. Whatever the ultimate political settlement in Europe may be, it can only be worse if it has been preceded by years of hunger, misery, banditry and ignorance.

"In 1918, the 'realistic' ones were in favour of keeping up the blockade after the Armistice. We did keep up the blockade, and the children we starved then were the young men who were bombing us in 1940. No one, perhaps, could have foreseen just that result, but people of good will could and did foresee that the results of wantonly starving Germany, and of making a vindictive peace, would be evil."

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While Admiral Raeder, German Navy Commander, stands trial at Nuremberg as a war criminal charged, among other crimes, with waging unrestricted submarine warfare, the United States Navy disclosed on February 2 that it had waged unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan, using the "wolf-pack" system which had been made notorious by the Germans. In a news conference on February 2, held by Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, wartime Commander of submarines in the Pacific, it was revealed that the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, a few days after Pearl Harbor, sent out the following instructions: "Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." In one of the statements issued at the conference, it was said: "It took moral courage of the highest order" to send out the order for unrestricted air and submarine warfare.

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It looks as if the British Government has bought a pig in a poke: When Parliament ratified the Bretton Woods monetary and financial agreements, the British reportedly believed that they would obtain a sizable loan from the United States. But, today, the loan has run into heavy weather in Congress and may even be rejected. At any rate, there will be about five weeks of hearings on the loan before a vote is taken in Congress. Weeks before that date, on March 15, Britain is scheduled to sit down at Savannah with representatives of those Powers which have ratified the Bretton Woods Agreements. How can Britain effectively act at Savannah, complain British circles in Washington, unless they know the fate of the loan? Sir Wilfrid Eady, Joint Secretary of the British Treasury is even more outspoken. On February 12, he said that Britain would have to withdraw immediately from the Bretton Woods compact, and other projects of world economic cooperation, if the proposed loan should be refused. And Lord Beaverbrook, press magnate, has expressed similar views.

Soviet Russia, on the other hand, is in no such difficult position. Russian comment on the Bretton Woods scheme early emphasized that in order to make the monetary fund capable of coping with its tasks, large-scale and long-term credits to countries with adverse balance of payments were a necessary pre-condition. Russia, for a long time, has been seeking a loan, variously estimated at from one to five billion dollars, from the United States. So far, the United States has shown no disposition to grant it. And Russia, meanwhile, gives no indication of joining Bretton Woods.

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Colonel Peron, who will meet his fate in the elections on February 24, has been retorting desperately to our State Department's charges in the Blue Book. But it would be a mistake to assume that his sparring with Braden is merely for domestic election purposes. The Argentine adventurer is also trying to widen the breach between the United States and other American republics, according to the best opinion in diplomatic circles. Differences between Washington and the capitals south of the border are increasing, and Peron's speech may induce many of these to be more symphathetic towards Argentina; and less tolerant of what they are coming to consider Washington's "Big Stick" policy. Their feeling is rising against recent proposals of the State Department for action at the projected Rio de Janeiro Conference in March. Our neighbors find these proposals contrary to the line of policy which, at the Mexico City Conference last spring, we promised to follow.

At that time, we pledged our word (1) to permit Argentine consideration of the treaty to be concluded at Rio; and (2) to respect the "individuality and independence" of all American nations. Today, the State Department omits these two vital points and asks merely for a hemispheric military alliance. It is significant that Mexico, Brazil and Ecuador have submitted proposals specifically including Argentina. These Governments dislike the Peron régime as much as we, but they place the principles of the Good Neighbor policy above ideological preferences. So did we, when we successfully backed Peron's Government for charter membership in the United Nations.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. III - No. 8

By Frank C. Hanighen February 20, 1946

A great myth is dying fast, and its demise will inevitably influence the directors of our foreign policy. Helter-skelter, most of those who propagated the notion that Stalin based his foreign policy on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount are now scrambling from the "pro-Russian" to -- it is feared -- the "anti-Russian" bandwagon. Nor have they paused to consider an alternative to these two extreme attitudes -- a civilized, truly American approach in dealing with our recent Allies. As the trend develops, our peripatetic opinion-formers may even seek to create the myth that Russia is the root of all evil.

This sudden shift in opinion collides with the Truman-Byrnes foreign policy, which has been, theoretically, to mediate and maintain a harmonious balance between Russian and British interests. As such it has been an excellent policy. But, in practice, as conducted by Mr. Byrnes, it has worked out as merely appeasement of Russia.

Will all this now change? Possibilities of a reversal of the Byrnes' policy are somewhat romantically implicated -- in Capital speculation on the subject -- with that by no means unromantic character, Mr. Winston Churchill. His flying trip to visit Mr. Truman was followed, on his return to Florida, by an unexplained visit from Mr. Byrnes, accompanied by Mr. Bernard Baruch. One question frequently asked in the past few days was: Did Byrnes get Churchill to soften the speech which the former British Premier will deliver in Missouri on March 5? For it is known that Churchill showed his first essay in Chautauqua to Mr. Truman and the latter approved it.

We learn on excellent authority that the draft of the speech shown Mr. Truman did not concern the British loan, as currently believed, but was an exposition of the world power situation, with emphasis on the fact that Britain and America had the "Power". As such, it could hardly prove palatable to Russian ears, although it did not specifically mention Russia.

Certainly if Mr. Churchill attempts to alter the course followed by Mr. Byrnes he can hardly be more blunt in his expressions than the London Economist. That authoritative journal, on January 26, with a sharp emphasis which underlines how seriously the British regard the situation, laid down "Two alternative courses . . . The first would be . . . to attempt to do a direct 'power politics' bargain with Moscow however much the Americans might dislike it. . . . The other alternative is to persuade the Americans to greater realism in their estimate of British support and friendship. . . . The foreign policy of Britain is clearly reaching a cross-roads at which a fundamental choice must be made." Are Mr. Churchill's oratorical plans part of a serious drive to "persuade the Americans"? If so, we have been informed of a possible alternative.

There is little doubt that the British regard the months to come as of crucial importance. It has come to us from good authority that they are convinced that differences with Russia will come to a crisis -- not unlike the German crises of 1938 and 1939 -- this summer, and have so alerted one of their vital organizations abroad. No wonder then that they are considering a "fundamental choice".

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Russian espionage in Canada is believed, by informed circles, to have been concerned not only with atomic information, but also with military dispositions and installations. Canada's highly strategic position in the Arctic and its position on the great circle air routes would naturally make it the locale of secret inquiry by a great Arctic Power like Russia. The United States' interest in this matter is obvious, as Canada's territory includes important Arctic approaches to our hemispheric defense.

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Russian foreknowledge of the atomic development in this country, revealed in the course of the Canada spy affair, should come as no surprise to Messrs. Churchill and Truman, if one can believe a current story about the Potsdam Conference. The British Premier and the American President at that meeting told Stalin that we had the atomic bomb. Stalin, it is said, replied with indifference that he already knew that.

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A correspondent just returned from Minnesota gives us the following estimate of the political situation in that state, with special reference to the fortunes of Captain Stassen. Stassen is liked by Minnesotans for his good record as Governor; he is popular with the veterans; he is wooing labor; and the coupling of his name with the Presidency is cause for local pride. He is indeed the "favorite son". But, at the same time, a change in the local attitude towards him is developing as it becomes more probable that the next President will be a Republican. Stassen as a Presidential possibility is one thing. Stassen as a Presidential probability is quite another. There is increasing criticism of his "dead-pan" manner, his coldly calculating nature, his relative inexperience and, lately, of his advocacy of peace-time conscription.

Stassen, moreover, is in a difficult political dilemma. If he runs in the Senatorial primaries against incumbent Senator Shipstead, he is likely to be beaten and he knows it. Yet, if he refuses to run against Shipstead, Minnesota will take it as a confession of weakness on the part of the former Governor. Moreover, he can scarcely confine himself to lecturing for the next two years and then emerge as a candidate in 1948.

Meanwhile another Republican figure, Congressman Judd of Minneapolis, who is wholly independent of Stassen, is coming to the fore. He has increased his popularity and he may run against Shipstead. Many think that he could beat the veteran Senator. If that should happen, Judd might replace Stassen as Minnesota's "favorite son".

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Reluctantly, we pass on the following unkind remark of one of our friends: "Someone asked me whether I thought that the Russians have the atom bomb. I replied, 'I don't know. But anyway they don't need it as long as they have Jimmy Byrnes'."

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Advices from Lisbon say that arrangements have tentatively been made for the return of Don Juan of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, the retirement of Franco and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Madrid. Don Juan, however, does not want to start his reign amid famine conditions; the fate of the harvest is still uncertain; and the Pretender prefers to wait until May to see how the crops fare. If, by that time, the agricultural conditions are auspicious, he may take power. This solution of the Spanish question would commend itself not only to those Spaniards who prefer a monarchy to a Red Terror, but also to the British, who want a friendly Power on the edge of Gibraltar. Don Juan, incidentally, served in the British Navy during the war.

Some observers, however, fear that Republican and Communist elements will try to forestall Don Juan, by staging a border incident as an excuse for armed invasion from France. The Giral Republican Government-in-Exile is now located in Paris; there are numerous Spanish Republican units in Southern France; and strong pressure is being exerted on the French Government to break relations with Franco. The situations in both Spain and France provide the basis for possible troubles of a serious nature in this part of Western Europe.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. III - No. 10

By Frank C. Hanighen March 6, 1946

When the Canadian Government first revealed details of the Russian espionage affair, this column mentioned Arctic defense secrets as one of the objectives of the NKVD work. Now it can be disclosed that the creation of an American defense system in the Arctic is well under way. Although many details must remain military secrets, this much may be said: that a wide and deep network of air bases is now being constructed in Northern Canada and Alaska. The United States is giving full assistance and collaboration to Canada in this task.

Since bases raise a logistical problem, a highly important expedition set forth on February 15, from Churchill, Manitoba, on Hudson Bay, for an 81 day exploration of the North; to study weather conditions, radio performance, and requirements for food, clothing and, above all, transport in the Arctic. The expedition will reportedly test a new type of "snow-mobile". The much publicized northern cruise of the carrier Midway is also related to these defense preparations.

Nor is the Soviet Union idle in this respect. Definite information regarding a large number of Arctic bases both in European Russia -- in the Murmansk-Archangel area -- and in the farther extremity of Russia-in-Asia -- in Kamchatka -- has reached America. Other bases on the icy northern fringe of Siberia are reported.

This feverish activity is due not only to the unfortunate suspicion which has arisen between former Allies, but also to the fact that the Arctic wastes have become of great military importance both to Russia and to United States-Canada. Without such defenses, bombers from one Power might have unimpeded passage right to the heart of the other. Military strategy being what it is, offense goes with defense and the farther north both sides can push their bases, the stronger their military positions.

Three developments have brought about this dramatic geo-political change and made the North our vital "glacis" of air defense: (1) immensely greater ranges of planes; (2) stratospheric flight; (3) perfection of radio and radar landings. The last two constitute a rather complete victory of man over weather. Stratosphere planes can now fly over the hitherto impenetrable Arctic fogs and by radio and radar can land on fog-bound fields.

This race for bases at present favors the North American combination. Air experts doubt that Russia now possesses, or will be able to build in less than two years, a real strategic bombing force. So far as we know, the Russians have less than 100 four-motor bombers, none as good as our B-29. On the other hand, before this year is out, our new B-36, capable of satisfying all strategic requirements for trans-polar flight will be in American production. It is believed, therefore, that there can be no threat to us from the Arctic before 1948 or 1949 at the earliest. But nothing military is static. Because of Stalin's announced plans for a huge military establishment, American military authorities are intensively pushing Arctic preparations.

Still to be brought into this scheme of Arctic hemispheric defense are Greenland and Iceland. The State Department is in negotiation with the Iceland and Danish Governments for exclusive military air rights in both areas; in Iceland, the large Meeks Field and a number of outlying fields; and in Greenland, sea plane bases and radio and radar stations.

As for Canada -- now of primary military interest to the United States almost for the first time since the War of 1812 -- its role and the motives prompting its policy will be treated in future issues of this column.

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Did Secretary Byrnes, in his speech on February 28, announce a definite change in our policy towards Russia? On the morrow of the speech, informed observers in Washington were inclined to be non-committal. They recalled that Byrnes, after a stand against Russia at the London Conference last fall, turned to appeasement at the Moscow Conference. One Member of Congress, in a similar mood, was heard to remark acidly: "Byrnes' actions speak so loudly that I cannot hear his words." Also the State Department announcement, less than 24 hours after the speech, about a $1,000,000,000 credit to the Soviet Union inspired caution.

But Byrnes' (as yet unpublished) notes to Russia on Iran and Manchuria have swung many to the belief that the foreign policy has been reversed. Not only his action in this respect, but the spectacle of President Truman appearing with Mr. Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, when the latter delivered his forthright attack on Russian policy and on Communism, have pushed our official attitude rather far out on the proverbial limb. And Senator Vandenberg's speech, as an index of Republican attitude, is not forgotten. Our policy, if not changed, is changing so rapidly that a return to appeasement -- while not ruled out -- would prove a rather drastic and hazardous operation, not least of all to the Secretary of State. Some observers believe there is no little substance to Constantine Brown's story that Byrnes may be replaced by General Marshall. Marshall has reportedly been summoned to Washington.

Mr. Churchill's speech was admired, although there was much dissent with his proposal for Anglo-American alliance. It was noted that Mr. Truman in introducing the former British Premier was rather careful not to associate himself with the sentiments in the latter's speech, which, of course, he had seen. The text is being given no little study by diplomats. One observer has noted the following: "I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." This is a rather close echo of the message of Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to the Quai d'Orsay, in 1914: "Germany does not desire war. What she desires is the fruits of war."

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Behind the British-French-American statement calling for the ouster of Franco lies one prevailing desire -- to delay action in the matter. This is known to be the attitude of the British Government and of the French Foreign Office; it is possibly true of the American State Department, which has no desire for an early and violent overthrow of Franco, nor for military or economic intervention. French Foreign Minister Bidault is said to have admitted confidentially that he did not personally favor the move, but that he was forced to back it because of pressure from the Communists and Socialists in his Government. Bidault asked for submission of the matter to UNO, on the assumption that this would delay the issue for several months. By that time, the prospects of the harvest in Spain would be clear and a course could be determined.

The harvest question, while very important, is probably being used as a temporary expedient to avoid any drastic action. It was heavily stressed in the unpublished British note to France, when the former ordered closing of the Franco-Spanish border. Britain in that note expressed strong disapproval of the French action and its belief that any attempt, military or economic, to overthrow Franco would precipitate civil war. Even if a new government should be established, said the British, it would be of a highly unstable nature, due to the uncertainties of the coming harvest. Bad crops would destroy the prestige of such a government before it had a fair chance to show the Spanish people the blessings of democracy. While the British arguments are undoubtedly sound, Whitehall may be using them to gain more time, which would be employed in pushing the fortunes of the Spanish Pretender, Don Juan of Bourbon. The British want no anarchy or communism on the doorstep of Gibraltar. Observers, therefore, doubt that any decisive moves in the Spanish matter will occur before May.

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